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In And For The State of Utah
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This appeal is subject to transfer by the Supreme Court to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to the Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(4).

Appellant asserts the issue the he has been denied Due process of Law
by the failure of the Second District Court Clerks and Judges of the Ogden
Department to comply with The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ad case law
precedent.
The Standard of Review is the propriety of the dismissal under this
Rule is a matter of Law reviewable for correctness. Stokes V. Van
Wagoner, 1999, Utah 94, 987 P.2d 602. (See Addendum)

6. The Forth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America
Utah Court Rules Annotated;
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 5(a)(2), Rule 55(a), Rule 55
(b)(l)&(2), Rule 54(c)(2), Rule 54(d)( 1), Rule 52(c)(1), Rule 8(d), Rule
12(a), Rule 12(b), Rule 12(e), Rule 12(h), Rule 12(h)(1), Rule 7(a), Rule
7(b), Rule 7(c)(2), Rule 7(c)(3)(c), Rule 7(d), and Rule 1 l(b)(l)&(2).
(See Addendum)
Determinative Case Law;
Utah Case Law: St Benedicts Dev. Co. V St. Benedicts Hospital 811
P.2d 194, Russell V. Standard Corp. 898 P.2d 263, Mounteer V. Utah Power
and Light Co. 823 P.2d 105, Liquor Control Commission V. Athas 243 P.2d
441, Christensen V. Lelis Automatic Transmission Service Inc. 467 P.2d
605, Stokes V. VanWagnor 987 P.2d 602, Clark V. Booth 821 P.2d 1146,
Harvey V. Sanders 534 P.2d 905, Salt Lake County V. Salt Lake City 570
P.2d 119, Lind V. L\nch 665 P.2d 1276 , Strand V. Associated Students of
Univ. of Ut. 561 P.2d 191. (See Addendum)

7. Statement of the Case
a. This is a civil case asking damages for several miscellaneous causes of
action. (See Amended Complaint in Addendum)
b. The original complaint filed 051\ 7 2007 comprising seven causes of
action and listed on pages 001-005 of the record index. Was followed by an
amended complaint of eight causes of action file on 06 04 2007 and listed on
pages 010-013 of the record index.
3

No answer was ever filed by the Defendant Willard Lowe or his
attorne\ Branden B. Miles within the twenty day period for answering the
summons.
The statutory plea period thus expired with no answer filed in this
case and Plaintiff through his agent. Ursula Cody, notified the Second
District Court Clerk to make entry of default by Defendant in this case on
July 3 ui 2007. The Clerk refused to make such entry upon oral request, so
subsequentK Plaintiff filed with the Court Clerk through his agent Ursula
Cody a written notice to enter default of Defendant on July 5th 2007. (See
Addendum)
Defendant Willard Low es alleged answer to the summons and
complaint supposedly filed with the Second District Court Clerk on
07/05/2007 and listed as page 027 in the record index was in fact notes
Plaintiff gave to his agent Ursula Cody to show the Court Clerk the amount
of damages to be awarded to Plaintiff by the judgment of the Clerk at that
time. Neither Mr. Lowe nor his Attorney Branden Miles can refute this fact.
The alleged answer to the summons carries no signature and is therefore in
violation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 7. (See Addendum) Thus
Plaintiff Jason Cody was and is entitled to a judgment by default against
Defendant Willard Lowe if the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are to be
followed. The Second District Court Clerks Office and Second District
Court Judge Ernie Jones have attempted to ignore the above stated facts and
instead circumvent the law to suit their own personal preference by claiming
this non existent answer was filed by the Defendant and/or his Attorney.
Subsequently Defendants Counsel Branden Miles filed with the Court Clerk
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted ostensibly filed 07/05/2007 pages 032-050 of the record index. The
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was actually filed with the
Court Clerk on or about 07/09/2007, well after the close of pleadings in this
case. Plaintiff Jason Cody made several attempts to correct this erroneous
situation by filing \arious motions and notices with the Court but to no avail.
The Court insisted on ignoring the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure preferring
instead to exact the Courts personal idea of justice. The Plaintiff Jason Cody
then submitted numerous motions to the Court including a motion for leave
of the Court to amend complaint, motion to order clerk to make Entry of
Default by the defendant Nunc Pro Tunc to July 5lh 2007, and a motion to
schedule a hearing to determine the amount of damages to which the
Plaintiff is entitled. (See Addendum) Subsequently after the appropriate
time had tolled the Plaintiff submitted notices to submit his afore mentioned
motions along with notices to submit the Defendants motion to dismiss for
4

failure to state a claim and the Defendants motion to consolidate cases
070902903 and 070902904. All these notices were filed with the Court
Clerk on 08 27'2007. (See Addendum) The docket for case 070902903 was
noted on 08,27 2007 that the case has alreadv been dismissed by Court
ruling from Judge Jones. Court is sending back the Notice to Submit to
Petitioner mailed 08/29,2007. Prior to the court making a ruling granting the
defendants motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim signed by Judge
Ernie Jones 08 23/2007. The Defendants Attornev Branden Miles had not
filed a notice to submit his motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Therefore the onlv notice to submit the Defendants motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim was filed by the Plaintiff on 08/27/2007 and not
accepted by the Court and returned to the Plaintiff resulting in no notice to
submit Defendants motion to dismiss. Thus Judge Jones should never have
been in a receipt of Defendants motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
if the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were followed. (See Addendum)
The Court Clerk after having refused to accept the filing of the
Plaintiffs above mentioned notices to submit his motions as well as the
Defendants motions on 08/27/2007. Nevertheless advised and accepted
Branden Miles notice to submit his motion to consolidate on 09/17/2007
pages 123-124 of the record index and Judge Jones Court subsequently
issued a ruling regarding defendants motion to consolidate the ruling was
made 09/24/2007 and is listed as 127-128 of the record index. This
demonstrates bias and preferential treatment of the Defendants filings.
The disposition of the case at Trial Court is the ruling made by Judge
Jones on 08/23/2007 granting Defendants motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim pages 120-122 in the record index.

Summary of Argument
Plaintiff Appellant Jason Codv followed the Utah Court Rules and the
Utah Rules of Ci\il Procedure in filing his initial complaint and summons
and amended complaint and summons and complied with the Rules of the
court in all manner and thus was entitled to a judgment by default of the
defendant when the defendant failed to file an answer to the complaint. The
Court should ne\er had made a ruling on defendants motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, as a notice to submit such motion was never accepted
by the Court Clerk and was never submitted by the Defendant or his

5

Attorney Brandon Miles. The Court can t grant a motion that has not been
brought before the court.
The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim that was filed with
the Court Clerk on or about 07/09/2007 does however ha\e significance in
that filing such a motion the defendant and his Attorney admit the truth of
the allegations made in the complaint. Thus they have admitted the
Plaintiffs allegations by failure to file an answer to the summons and
complaint and additionally for a second time admitted to the Plaintiffs
allegations by filing that particular motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.

Conclusion
The Plaintiff Appellant Jason Cody has abided by the Utah Rules of
the Court in filing this action and subsequent notices and motions and
became entitled to judgment by default of Defendant when defendant failed
to answer the summons of complaint in the allowed amount of time.
Plaintiff Appellant then in a diligent fashion notified the Court Clerk of the
default of Defendant and should have had an award granted at that time or a
hearing scheduled to determine the amount of damages to which the Plaintiff
was entitled. The Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendant as
follows:
1. Reverse the District Courts Ruling and find in favor of the
Plaintiff
2. An award of actual damages, (direct and consequential), in the
amount of $50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Dollars). Plus special
damages for CAUSE OF ACTION NO. 7 in an amount to be
determined by the court.
3. An award of punitive damages four times the amount of actual
damages awarded.
4. For all costs inclined and for reasonable attorney's fees in the
amount of at least $1,000.00 (One Thousand Dollars).
5. For interest on all judgment awards, at the highest legal rate in the
state of Utah.
6. And for such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.
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Dated this 1 7m da> of April 2008
Jas&n Cod/Pro se
'/

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the forgoing Brief of
the Appellant including Addendum was hand delivered to the Defendant
Willard Lowe's Attorney Mr. Branden B. Miles on April 18th 2008 at the
following address Weber County Attorney's Office Branden B. Miles,
Attorney for the Defendant, Suite No. 230 at 2380 Washington Blvd. Ogden
Utah 84401-1464.

Dated this 17th day of April 2008

^
Jason Cody Pro se
V
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Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Service Whip in

IITM|IJII>;JII.

(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the court,
every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to
the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written motion other than one
heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar
paper shall be served upon each of the parties.
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that:
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the antrt;
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served
with all pleadings and papers;
(a)(2)(C) a paity in default foi aiiy reason shall be served witli notice of any hearing
necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party;
(a)(2)(D) a party in defaulf fm ,'tny it .r
under Rule 58A(d); and

n shrill lid seivet

•: •

-? -

* judgment

(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in delatill foi
any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, in which no person is named as defendant,
any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, claim or appearance shall be
made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at the time of its seizure.
(b) Service: How made.
(b)(1) If a party is represented by ari attorney, service shall be made upon the attorney
unless service upon the party is ordered by the court If an attorney has filed a Notice of
Limited Appearance under Rule 75 and the papers being served relate to a matter within the
scope of the Notice, service shall be made upon the attorney and the party.
(b)(1)(A) If a hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, the party shall
use the method most likely to give prompt actual notice of the hearing. Otherwise, a party shall
serve a paper under this rule:
(b)(1)(A)(i) upon any person with an electronic filing account who is a party or attorney in
the case by submitting the paper for electronic filing;
(b)(1)(A)(ii) by sending it by email to the person's last known email address if that person
has agreed to accept service by email;
(b)(1)(A)(iii) by faxing it to the person's last known fax number if that person has agreed to
accept service by fax;
(b)i iHAiimvi h\ ni ni i. mi I ni i HI it to tlif DPI ,i in's last known address:

http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp005.html
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(b)(1)(A)(v) by handing it to the person;
(b)(1)(A)(vi) by leaving it at the person's office with a person in charge or leaving it in a
receptacle intended for receiving deliveries or in a conspicuous place; or
(b)(1)(A)(vii) by leaving it at the person's dwelling house or usual place of abode with a
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail, email or fax is complete upon sending. Service by electronic
means is not effective if the party making service learns that the attempted service did not
reach the person to be served.
(b)(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court:
(b)(2)(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a judgment
signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it;
(b)(2)(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be served by
the party preparing it; and
(b)(2)(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court.
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there is an unusually large
number of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own initiative, may order that service of
the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as between the
defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the plaintiff constitutes
notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order shall be served upon the parties in such
manner and form as the court directs.
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed
with the court either before or within a reasonable time after service. The papers shall be
accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date and manner of service completed by
the person effecting service. Rule 26(i) governs the filing of papers related to discovery.
(e) Filing with the court defined. A party may file with the clerk of court using any means of
delivery permitted by the court. The court may require parties to file electronically with an
electronic filing account. Filing is complete upon the earliest of acceptance by the electronic
filing system, the clerk of court or the judge. The filing date shall be noted on the paper.

http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp005.html
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Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders, objection to
commissioner's order.
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an
answer to a cross claim, if the answer contains a cross claim; a third party complaint, if a
person who was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third
party answer, if a third party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except
that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer.
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless
made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be made in
accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with particularity
the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought.
(b)(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order to show cause
shall be made only for enforcement of an existing order or for sanctions for violating an existing
order. An application for an order to show cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to
show cause to believe a party has violated a court order.
(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncontested or ex
parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days after
service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a
memorandum in opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition,
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters
raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will be considered without
leave of court. A party may attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum.
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave ot
the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the court.
The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and
a showing of good cause.
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists.
Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted
by the responding party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain
a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute,
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated
and numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or
discovery materials.

http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp007.html
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(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of
contents and a table of authorities with page references.
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents
cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a
"Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision shall state the date on
which the motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the
date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If
no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a hearing
in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A request for hearing
shall be separately identified in the caption of the document containing the request. The court
shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of
the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided.
(f) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in
writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of money may be enforced in the
same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise provided by these rules, any order
made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it
with or without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation,
motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum,
or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the
court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's
decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The
party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or
upon expiration of the time to object.
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate
documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference.
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of a court
commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A party may object to the
recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner as filing a motion within ten days
after the recommendation is made in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter
under advisement, ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party
may respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion.

http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp007.html
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Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different
types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall
admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the
substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an
averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader
intends in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials
of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general
denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction,
arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds,
statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has
mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires,
shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the
amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no
responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
(e)(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are
required.
(e)(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count
or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if
made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and
whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth
in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.
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Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, affidavits, and other papers; representations
to court; sanctions.
(a) Signature.
(a)(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record, or, if the party is not represented by the party.
(a)(2) A person may sign a paper using any form of signature recognized by law as binding.
Unless required by statute, a paper need not be accompanied by affidavit or have a notarized,
verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or
acknowledged signature, the person may submit a declaration pursuant to Utah Code Section
46-5-101. If a statute requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature
and the party electronically files the paper, the signature shall be notarized pursuant to Utah
Code Section 46-1-16.
(a)(3) An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the
court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party
is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by
a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law;
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery; and
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines
that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below,
impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated
subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(c)(1) How initiated.
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately *rom
other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision
(b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court
unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not
withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing
on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing
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the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for
violations committed by its partners, members, and employees.
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing
the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm,
or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule sha'l be
limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others
similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may
consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court,
or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a
direct result of the violation.
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a
violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court
issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made
by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(c)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to
constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the
provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve an answer within
twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after service
of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve
an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer
within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows,
unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does
not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims:
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall
be served within ten days after notice of the court's action;
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days
after the service of the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to
serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If,
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any
party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated ( l ) - ( 7 ) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a
pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined
before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until
the trial.
,
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous
that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite
statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details
desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or within
such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order
as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted
by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other motions herein
provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and
objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based
on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer or reply,
except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if
one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light
of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made pursuant to
these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion.
0) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or is a foreign
corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be
awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court
shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs and
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Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court
adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law
are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except
as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its
findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for
a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question
has made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for
judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law
may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact:
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
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Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments shall
state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise directed by the
court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as
to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his
pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires
it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically
prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these rules,
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an
appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other
proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A
party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to
have the bill of costs taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and
filed on the date judgment is entered.
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any interest on
the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk
must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment,
insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the
register of actions and in the judgment docket.
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Rule 55. Default.
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as
provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against the
defendant i f :
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear;
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person;
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation.
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter,
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default
has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment
by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a
judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of
Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court.
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denial made pursuant to Subdivision (b). General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.,
545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976); Pratt v. Board of
Educ, 564 R2d 294 (Utah 1977).
Notice and opportunity.
The purpose of Subdivision (c) is to provide
the parties with notice of the issues raised and
an opportunity to meet them, and, where a
party has notice and opportunity, failure of the
other to plead pursuant to this rule will not bar
receipt of evidence on a defense. Cheney v.
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P2d 86 (1963).
If the interests of justice so require and the
opposing party is given a fair opportunity to
meet the defense, the trial court may permit an
affirmative defense that was not pleaded in the
answer as required by Subdivision (c) to be
tried. F.M.A. Fin. Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah
2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965).
Permissive amendment,
Where the defendant had not moved to
amend its answer to add an affirmative defense
after the plaintiff objected to the raising of the
defense at trial and the trial court did not
undertake the requisite procedural steps for
determining whether to allow an amendment,
the court abused its discretion in permitting
the defense. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin.,
Inc., 1999 UT 13, 974 P2d 288.
Waiver of defense.
Because an affirmative defense raises matters outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie
case, matters constituting such defenses must
be pleaded, and are not put in issue by a denial
pursuant to Subdivision (b) of this rule; failure
to so plead constitutes waiver of the defense
pursuant to Rule 12(h). Pratt v. Board of Educ,
564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977).
—Fraud.
Necessary allegations.
Defendants were not foreclosed from asserting defenses based on fraud by their failure to
use the term "fraud" or a derivative thereof or
by their failure to allege every element of common-law fraud, when the substance of the acts
constituting the alleged fraud had been
pleaded. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P2d 663
(Utah 1985).
—Limitation of Landowner Liability Act.
The Limitation of Landowner Liability Act
(§ 57-14-1 et seq.) constitutes an "affirmative
defense" or an "avoidance" in a wrongful death
action alleging negligence, and to preserve the
act as a defense, it must be raised in the
defendant's answer. Golding v. Ashley Cent.
Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990).
—Mitigation of damages.
Failure to plead.
Failure to plead mitigation of damages did
not result in an automatic waiver of the defense
where both the pleadings and the parties' opening statements at trial showed that the plaintiff
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plaintiff's failure to mitigate. Price-Orem Inv.
Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d
55 (Utah 1986).
Pleading.
An employer who wishes to obtain the advantage of the rule that a wrongfully discharged
employee is under an obligation to minimize
damages, by seeking other employment, must
raise the matter as an affirmative defense in
his pleadings. Pratt v. Board of Educ, 564 P.2d
294 (Utah 1977).
—Mutual mistake.
Mutual mistake is an affirmative defense as
it raises matters outside the plaintiff's prima
facie case, and the failure to assert it is a
waiver of that defense. Mabey v. Kay Peterson
Constr. Co., 682 P2d 287 (Utah 1984).
—Statute of frauds.
Motion to dismiss.
The defense of the statute of frauds is an
affirmative defense which must be pleaded pursuant to Subdivision (c) and may not be raised
by a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b).
WW. & WB. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah
2d 264, 470 P2d 252 (1970).
Pleading.
The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense which must be set forth in the pleadings,
else it is waived. Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666
P.2d 876 (Utah 1983).
—Statute of limitations.
Applicability to plaintiffs.
Rule that statutes of limitation generally
must be pleaded or are waived usually applies
to defendants only; this rule cannot hold plaintiff to same accountability; where, in quiet title
action, defendant attacks validity of tax sale,
only pleading available to plaintiff to assert
statute of limitations is in reply, unauthorized
unjler Rule 7(a) as matter of right, except in
attacking counterclaim, and otherwise available only by order of court. Hansen v. Morris, 3
Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d 884 (1955); Thomas v.
Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 R2d 507
(1956), overruled on other grounds, First Equity Fed., Inc., v. Phillips Dev., 2002 UT 56, 52
P3d 1137.
In action to quiet title, plaintiff holders of tax
deed were not required to plead statute of
limitations (§§ 78-12-5.2, 78-12-5.3) and defendants were not required to anticipate defense of
statute of limitations where statute was first
pleaded in plaintiff's reply to defendant's answer asserting title. Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs,
6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P2d 507 (1956), overruled on
other grounds, First Equity Fed., Inc., v. Phillips Dev., 2002 UT 56, 52 P.3d 1137.
In action by water user challenging charges
of water district, plaintiff waived thirty-day
limitations statute (§ 17A-2-315) by failing to
plead it in answer to defendant's counterclaim.
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397,
375 P 2d 456(1962)

Rule 8

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

case and is thus not affirmative defense; therefore, where defendant failed to deny in answer
that there was consideration for agreement,
Tact should be taken as admitted. General Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d
502 (Utah 1976).
There is a distinction between lack of consideration and failure of consideration. When consideration is lacking, there is no contract. When
consideration fails, there was a contract when
the agreement was made, but the promised
performance has failed, failure of consideration is an affirmative defense under Subdivision (c), whereas the defense of lack of consideration, a negative, is properly pleaded under
Subdivision (b). DeMentas v. Estate of Tallas ex
rel. First Sec. Bank, 764 P.2d 628 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Effect of failure to deny.
In an action for modification of the custody
provision in a divorce decree, it was appropriate for the trial court to rule on appellee's
petition, absent any responsive pleading, and
to accept the allegations in the petition as true
in resolving the threshold requirement of
whether appellant's circumstances had materially changed; however, it does not follow that
appellee's petition entitled her to relief. A trial
court asked to render a judgment by default
must first conclude that the uncontroverted
allegations of an applicant's petition are, on
their face, legally sufficient to establish a valid
claim against the defaulting party. Stevens v.
Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
modified on other grounds, 863 P.2d 534 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).
Purpose of rules.
The fundamental purpose of the liberalized
pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege
of presenting whatever legitimate contentions
they have pertaining to their dispute, subject
only to the requirement that their adversaries
have fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim and a general indication of
the type of litigation involved. Williams v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 656 P2d 966 (Utah 1982).
Sufficiency of complaint.
Complaint need only give fair notice of nature and basis or grounds of claim and indication of type of litigation; it is sufficient unless
plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in
support of claim. Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3
Utah 2d 157, 280 P.2d 453 (1955).
Employee's complaint for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with an employment contract
clearly alleged the language complained of; the
employee's failure to set forth any allegation in
her complaint that a qualified privilege applied
and that the privilege had been abused was not
fatal in the context of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. Zoumadakis v. Uintah
Basin Med. Ctr., Inc., 2005 UT App 325, 122
P.3d 891.
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exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose
of supplying necessary material averments nor
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard
v. Appleby, 660 P2d 245 (Utah 1983).
—Claim against estate.
Surviving wife's claim as a creditor of her
husband's estate under an antenuptial agreement was barred by her failure to make the
claim within one year as required by § 75-3803. Merely providing the estate representative
with a copy of the antenuptial agreement, without explaining how the agreement had been
breached or the amount the wife was claiming
as a creditor under the agreement, did not
satisfy the requirements of notice pleading. In
re Estate of Uzelac, 2005 UT App 234, 526 Utah
Adv. Rep. 33, 114 P.3d 1164.
—Found not sufficient.
Complaint did not state claim for relief from
discrimination or arbitrary action where it alleged that plaintiff's land, zoned residential,
was unsuitable for residential purposes, city
refused to rezone, and zoning ordinance was
oppressive, confiscatory and unlawful; relief
required that health, safety, morals or general
welfare of district and community would be
promoted by permitting commercial or industrial establishments in residential area. Dowse
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P2d
723 (1953).
Use of terms "fraud," "conspiracy" and "negligence" in complaint constituted general accusations in the nature of conclusions of the
pleader which, without the setting out of basic
facts sufficient to constitute the charged actions, would not stand up against a motion to
dismiss. Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266,
372 P.2d 990 (1962).
Complaint claiming that there was a breach
of the provisions of a title insurance policy, but
which did not set out the particular provision or
provisions claimed to have been breached, did
not meet the requirements of Subdivision (a)
and was properly dismissed. Ellis v. Hale, 13
Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962).
Complaint was insufficient where it contained merely broad and general statements
that false affidavit and false pleadings were
filed and judges contacted, and that these actions prevented plaintiff from obtaining default
judgment; proper complaint would have contained such allegations as contents, nature or
substance of false statements and of conversations between attorneys and judges. Heathman
v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d
189 (1962).
Complaint that simply averred that "defendant made, declared and published to certain
persons certain derogatory and libelous statements relating and pertaining to the plaintiff
which tended to degrade and discredit him" was
properly dismissed as not stating a cause of
action for slander. Dennett v. Smith, 21 Utah 2d
368, 445 P.2d 983 (1968).
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P.2d 825 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S.
900, 112 S. Ct. 276, 116 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1991).
Trial court erred in granting a Nevada casino's motion to dismiss a Utah patron's personal
injury suit, where the patron's complaint alleged sufficient facts to support general personal jurisdiction over the casino by the State of
Utah. Ho v. Jim's Enters., Inc., 2001 UT 63, 29
P.3d 633.
Motion for judgment on pleadings.
Motion for judgment on the pleadings to
decide upon distribution of trust assets was
inappropriate in a proceeding among trust beneficiaries to determine distribution and offsets.
Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 105, 46 P.3d
233, aff d, 2004 UT 22, 89 P.3d 148.
Trial court properly granted judgment on the
pleadings to defendant restaurants in wrongful
death action alleging negligence and negligence
per se against the restaurants for furnishing
alcohol to decedent, plaintiffs' son, who later
died when he lost control of his car, because
Utah does not recognize a common-law, firstparty action against dramshops for injuries
suffered by an intoxicated person. Miller v.
Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 UT App 80, 520 Utah
Adv. Rep. 9, 110 R3d 144.
—Matters outside of pleadings.
Answers to interrogatories.
Answers to interrogatories are not a part of
the pleadings for purposes of judgment on the
pleadings and if the court considers them the
other party must have the privilege of offering
answering affidavits as upon a motion for summary judgment. Securities Credit Corp. v.
Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 (1953).
Rights of opposing party.
On review of a motion on the pleadings
treated as a motion for summary judgment
under Subdivision (c), the party against whom
the judgment has been granted is entitled to
have all the facts presented, and ail the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a
light most favorable to him. Young v. Texas Co.,
8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P2d 1099 (1958).
Motion for more definite statement.
—Bill of particulars.
A motion for a more definite statement, and
not discovery procedures, is the appropriate
means of obtaining the information formerly
sought by a bill of particulars. Securities Credit
Corp. v. Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P2d 422
(1953).
—Criteria.
A motion for a more definite statement is
properly made only when the complaint is indefinite, ambiguous, or vague in either factual
allegations or legal theory to such an extent
that the moving party cannot reasonably be
required to frame his responsive pleading. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457,
243 P.2d 441 (1952).
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certain respects to enable defendant to answer,
the proper remedy is a motion for a more
definite statement, not a motion to dismiss.
Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457,
243 P.2d 441 (1952).
—Purpose.
Delay.
A motion for a more definite statement
should be summarily dealt with if made for the
purpose of delay. Liquor Control Comm'n v.
Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P2d 441 (1952).
Obtaining evidence.
Motions for a more definite statement are not
properly used to obtain evidence from the
pleader. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121
Utah 457, 243 P2d 441 (1952).
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.
—Conversion.
Trial court erroneously characterized defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion as one for a judgment on the pleadings, which was improper
because defendants' memorandum and attachments were not pleadings. Because the plaintiffs stated a claim for negligence upon which
relief could be granted, the dismissal of that
claim could not be justified under Rule 12(b)(6).
The court should have converted the motion
into one for summary judgment. Tuttle v. Olds,
2007 UT App 10, 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 155
P3d 893.
—Explained.
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6)
admits the facts alleged in the complaint but
challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based on
those facts. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P2d 194 (Utah 1991); Russell
v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995).
abeas corpus.
though Rule 65B generally governs the
drafting, filing, and disposition of habeas corpus petitions, Subdivision (b)(6) of this rule
applies to habeas corpus petitions in which
petitioner fails to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933
P.2d 987 (Utah 1997).
—Improper.
Dismissal of defendant's counterclaim was
reversed because the record did not persuade
the appeals court that there was no set of facts
under which the defendant might succeed. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (claim of unjust enrichment if no reimbursement for payment made
on loan guarantee).
In a wrongful death action based on attractive nuisance doctrine, the term "aquatic trap"
in complaint could reasonably be construed to
refer to a hidden trap and complaint was sufficiently descriptive. Whipple ex rel. Whipple v.
American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218
aTtah 1996).

channelling devices, bridges, currents, and
trappings and that as a further direct and
proximate result of the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the irrigation ditch,
plaintiffs suffered damages for loss of financial
support, comfort, society, advice, care, companionship, affection and happiness of association
of the decedent, contained allegations of causation sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910
R2d 1218 (Utah 1996).
The trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's case because her allegation of facts concerning each element of the claim of breach of
contract was sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081
(Utah Ct. App. 2000).
Representative's case was improperly dismissed because her complaint was sufficient
and the defendants below never argued that
the complaint was inadequate; the trial court
inappropriately relied on factual determinations from the evidentiary hearing to Afsmiss
the case. Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3, 4 6 | Utah
Adv. Rep. 12, 65 P.3d 1184.
Trial court erred in dismissing claims for
fraud, concealment, and other intentional torts
on the grounds that they were barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations in Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-12-25(3) and 78-12-26(3). Whether
the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that a
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered
the claims earlier was a factual finding that
should be decided by a jury, not a judge. Russell/Packard Dev, Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App
316, 482 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 78 P3d 616, aff'd,
2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741.
Dismissal under Subdivision (b)(6) of claim
for injuries suffered at a state liquor store was
improper; the claim did provide a brief statement of the facts as required by the relevant
governmental immunity provision. Peeples v.
State, 2004 UT App 328, 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 16,
100 R3d 254.
—Parties.
Adoption agencies' declaratory judgment action against an association that had issued an
advisory opinion on the applicability of an interstate compact failed to state a claim against
the association because, although the association's position was adopted by state officials, its
opinion was not binding on anyone. Alternative
Options & Servs. for Children v. Chapman,
2004 UT App 488, 516 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 106
P.3d 744.
—Proper.
Trial court did not err in granting bank's
motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6)
where the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege
sufficient facts to support a negligence action;
the depository bank did not owe the plaintiff, as
a non-customer of the bank, a duty of care after
another person forged the plaintiff's signature
and deposited the checks at the bank. Ramsey
v. Hancock, 2003 UT App 319, 483 Utah Adv.
Rep. 10, 79 P3d 423.
Trial court properly dismissed a complaint
that was entirely and exclusively dependent on
the plaintiff's misunderstanding of the defen-

dant's legal obligations toward her and that
failed to plead a cognizable and actionable
claim. Pett v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 2004 UT App
150, 499 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 91 R3d 854.
Patient's claim was properly dismissed because the patient's risk of recurrence of breast
cancer was not an injury; the patient's claim for
the increased risk of recurrence of cancer was
not actionable. Medved v. Glenn, 2004 UT App
161, 499 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 92 R3d 176.
Church's motion to dismiss was granted in a
negligence case because it had no common law
duty to warn abuse victims about a priest's
prior child sexual abuse. There was no special
relationship between the parties giving rise to
such a duty, the abuse did not occur on church
property or during church functions, and the
priest was not a church employee, agent, or
clergy member. Doe v. Corp. of the President of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, 2004 UT App 274, 506 Utah Adv. 25, 98
P.3d 429, cert, denied, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah
2004).
Business's complaint against the Utah Department of Transportation, following the closure of an access route to the business during a
highway reconstruction project, failed to state a
claim for inverse condemnation under Utah
Const., Art. I, § 22; the business did not have a
protectable property interest in an easement of
access through the blocked routes and the business was accessible from another route during
the reconstruction project. Intermountain
Sports, Inc. v. DOT, 2004 UT App 405,512 Utah
Adv. Rep. 40, 103 P3d 716, cert, denied, 109
P.3d 804 (Utah 2005), cert, denied, — U.S. —,
126 S. Ct. 343, 163 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2005).
—Standard.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, the court must construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences
in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russell v.
Standard Corp., 898 P2d 263 (Utah 1995).
—Standard of review.
When reviewing a judgment entered on a
motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6), the
Court of Appeals is obliged to construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons
Co., 790 R2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); St.
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6)
will be affirmed only if it appears to a certainty
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief
under any state of facts which could be proved
in support of its claims. Heiner v. S.J. Groves &
Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Prows v. State, 822 P2d 764 (Utah 1991);
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property &
Cas. Ins. Co., 890 R2d 1029 (Utah 1995).
When reviewing a dismissal under this rule,
an appellate court must accept the material
allegations of the complaint as true, and the
trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it
clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no
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set of facts in support of his claim. Colman v.
Utah State Land Bd., 795 R2d 622 (Utah 1990);
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841
R2d 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); Wright v. University of
Utah, 876 R2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, the appellate court
gives the trial court's ruling no deference and
reviews it under a correctness standard. St.
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Wright v. University of
Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah
1995); Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co.,
910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996).
In determining whether the trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate
court must accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and consider all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Prows v.
State, 822 P2d 764 (Utah 1991); Whipple v.
American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218
(Utah 1996).
Father did not dispute that the dismissal of
his prior paternity action was a final judgment
on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion,
but merely argued that he did not authorize his
prior attorney to dismiss the first action; however, the father's second complaint contained
no allegation that dismissal of his prior action
was not authorized. Because the father's second litigation was decided on Rule 12(b) motion
to dismiss, an appellate court did not consider
factual allegations outside the complaint. (Unpublished decision.) Belloso v. Lindberg, 2005
UT App 132, cert, denied, 125 P3d 102 (Utah
2005).
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue.
—Forum-selection clause in contract.
The parties' prior agreement in the contract
that is the subject of the dispute as to the place
of the action will be given effect unless it is
unfair or unreasonable. Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., 868 R2d 809 (Utah 1993).
A plaintiff who brings an action in violation of
a choice-of-forum provision bears the burden of
proving that enforcing the clause is unfair or
unreasonable; to meet this burden, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the chosen state would
be so seriously an inconvenient forum that to
require the plaintiff to bring suit there would
be unjust. Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., 868
P.2d 809 (Utah 1993).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the franchisers' motion to dismiss the
franchisees' breach of contract claim under
Subdivision (b)(3) where the franchisees failed
to meet their burden of demonstrating that the
forum selection clause in the signed agreement
was unfair or unreasonable; the franchisees did
not show that suit in Arkansas rather than
Utah would be difficult and inconvenient.
Coombs v. Juice Works Dev., Inc., 2003 UT App
388. 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 81 P.3d 769.
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and breach of contract alleged by investors who
lost money in a failed investment venture were
properly dismissed because the investors failed
to plead damages to a corporation that had
assigned its claims to the investors. Coroles v.
Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,
79 P.3d 974.
—Fraud.
Primary fraud, securities fraud, and secondary fraud claims alleged by investors who lost
money in a failed investment venture were
properly dismissed because the investors failed
to plead with particularity, as required by Rule
9(b), in complaint that merely listed facts and
then recited the elements of fraud. Coroles v.
Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,
79 P.3d 974.
—How presented.
Affirmative defenses.
Since an affirmative defense raises matters
outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie case,
any matter that does not tend to controvert the
opposing party's prima facie case should be
pleaded and is not put in issue by denial pursuant to Rule 8(b). Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352
(Utah 1986).
The Limitation of Landowner Liability Act
(§ 57-14-1 et seq.) is an "affirmative defense" or
an "avoidance" in a wrongful death action alleging negligence, and, to preserve the act as a
defense, it must be raised in the defendant's
answer. Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co.,
793 P2d 897 (Utah 1990).
Divorce.
Trial court did not err in refusing defendant's
motion to dismiss and for a more definite statement in answer to plaintiff's divorce petition
alleging cruelty and habitual intoxication in
general terms. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120
Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951).
Election of remedies.
The*defense of election of remedies is an
affirmative one that must be raised by way of
answer, motion, or demand and may not be
raised for the first time on appeal. Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d
793 (Utah 1979).
Failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted.
A complaint does not fail to state a claim
unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any
state of facts which could be proved in support
of the claim. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas,
121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441 (1952); Christensen
v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Serv., Inc., 24
Utah 2d 165, 467 R2d 605 (1970).
A complaint is required to give the opposing
party fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim and a general indication of
the type of litigation involved, or it is subject to
dismissal under Subdivision (b)(6). Utah Steel
& Iron Co. v. Bosch, 25 Utah 2d 85, 475 R2d

since the contract to review bids on an equal
basis was too nebulous to be enforceable, and
the city is immune to tort action for deceit.
Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah
1974).
In an unlawful detainer action in which the
notice is defective, the defective notice results
in a failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted rather than lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595
P.2d 852 (Utah 1979).
General and special appearances.
The distinction between general and special
appearances has been abolished by Subdivision
(b) of this rule. Ted R. Brown & Assocs. v.
Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206 (Utah 1976).
Statute of frauds.
The defense of the statute of frauds is an
affirmative defense which must be pleaded pursuant to Rule 8(c) and may not be raised by a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision (b) of
this rule. W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pampas,
24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970).
Venue.
A motion to dismiss is not the correct form for
objecting to venue improperly laid; an objection
to venue should be made by a motion for change
of place of trial. Cannon v. Tuft, 3 Utah 2d 410,
285 P2d 843 (1955).
—When presented.
Amended answer.
Motion for leave to file an amended answer
was properly denied where movant failed to file
anything in support of the motion and did not
call the motion for hearing until the case was
called for trial four months later. Hein's Turkey
Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc.,
24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257 (1970).
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff.

Statute of limitations.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
considering information outside of the complaint for purposes of the relevant date of the
inception of the loss for statute of limitations
purposes. Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 2002 UT 54, 53 P.3d 947.
Summary judgment.
—Conversion of motion to dismiss.
Motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision
(b)(6) may be converted to summary judgment
only when it appears as a matter of law that the
plaintiff cannot recover; and where there was a
question of actual knowledge of defendant as to
the claim against the property, motion to dismiss and summary judgment were improper.
Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 1975).
Motion for dismissal in action for declaratory
judgment as to constitutionality and legality of
annexation conditions properly treated as motion for summary judgment. See Child v. City of
Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah 1975).
It is generally not well advised to treat a
motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570
P2d 119 (Utah 1977).
Where defendant's motion was initially for
dismissal because of plaintiff's failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, once
matters outside the pleadings were presented
to and not excluded by the trial court, the
motion was properly treated as one for summary judgment. Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276
(Utah 1983); Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc.,
874 P2d 120 (Utah 1994).
If a trial court cannot on its own motion
convert a Rule 12 motion to dismiss to a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment, then certainly
the Supreme Court should not allow the moving party to do so on appeal. Colman v. Utah
State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
When affidavits or other evidence is presented to support a motion to dismiss under
Subdivision (b)(6) of this rule and the court
does not exclude them, the motion is generally
treated as a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to U.R.C.P 56. DOIT, Inc. v. Touche,
Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 1996).
This rule does not convert motions based on
subdivisions (b)(1) through (5) into motions for
summary judgment simply because they include some affirmative evidence relating to the
basis for the motion. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT
82,987 P.2d 36; Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App
86, 67 P.3d 1042, cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946
(2003).

—Failure to file.
An objection raised that security for costs
was not filed within one month after notice is at
best but a technical one. Dismissal of action
with prejudice was an abuse of discretion since
the policy of the law is to minimize the effect of
technical objections which do not go to the
merits and are not prejudicial to the interests of
the parties. Bunting Tractor Co. v. Emmett D.
Ford Contractors, 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 P2d 191
(1954).
Where plaintiff died 16 days after initiating
suit, and 11 days after demand of a nonresident
cost bond under Subdivision (j), and, though
almost three months later, a surety bond was
filed as soon as an administrator was appointed, trial court should not dismiss action
for failure to file bond within 30 days. Hammond v. Calder, 8 Utah 2d 333, 334 P2d 562,
cert, denied, 361 U.S. 813, 80 S. Ct. 51, 4 L. Ed.
2d 60 (1959).

—Court's discretion.
If a motion to dismiss under Subdivision
(b)(6) is presented, the decision to consider
matters outside the pleadings initially lies in
the discretion of the trial court. Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191
(Utah 1977).

Standard of review.
The propriety of a dismissal under this rule is
a question of law, reviewable for correctness.
Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94, 987 P2d
602.

—Court's initiative.
A court should not, on its own initiative, try
to convert a motion for dismissal into one for
summary judgment by requesting additional
evidence. Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Cent., Inc.,
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mitted range of discretion in making an award
for such costs. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 977 R2d 508.
—Service on adverse party.
This rule requires that only one verified copy
be served and it is to be served to the court;
there is no requirement that the copy served
upon the party from whom costs are claimed be
verified. Barton v. Carson, 14 Utah 2d 182, 380
R2d 926 (1963).
—Statutory limits.
Award of costs in excess of those expressly
allowed by statute for service of subpoena,
witness fees and preparation of model, photographs and certified copies of documents was
improper even though the costs represented the
actual expenses incurred; fact that Supreme
Court has on occasion approved taxing of expense of depositions as costs should not be
taken as opening the door to other expenses of
the character claimed in the instant cas'e.
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 R2d 771 (Utah 1980).
Witness fees, travel expenses, and service of
process expenses are chargeable only in accordance with the fee schedule set by statute.
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 R2d 684 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Witness compensation in excess of the statutory schedule is generally inappropriate as a
cost. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 R2d 684 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
—Time for claiming.
Although the trial court may not award costs
until after the appeal, if any, the delay in the
award of costs does not excuse parties who
want to request costs from complying with the
deadline in this rule. Aurora Credit Servs. v.
Liberty W Dev., Inc., 2007 UT App 327, 588
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, — R3d —.
—Untimely filing of memorandum.
Although plaintiff filed an unverified memorandum of costs within five days after entry of
judgment, because he did not file a verified
memorandum of costs until after the five-day
period, plaintiff was not entitled to an award of
costs. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. New York
Term. Whse. Co., 10 Utah 2d 210, 350 P.2d 626
(1960).
Plaintiffs who were contractually entitled to
attorney fees, costs, and expenses, and applied
for them five weeks after judgment in their
favor, were not barred from receiving an award
of such fees by Subdivision (d)(2) because the
rule does not apply to expenses or attorney fees.
Howe v. Professional Manivest, Inc., 829 P.2d
160 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1992).
Failure of defendants to file a verified memorandum of costs within five days of the judgment required that an award of costs be deleted
from the judgment. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961
P.2d 305 (Utah 1998).
The requirement that a verified memorandum of costs be filed within five davs after the
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who failed to comply with the requirement that
she file and serve a memorandum of costs
within five days after entry of judgment.
Grindstaff v. Sheville (In re Sheville), 2003 UT
App 141, 473 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 71 R3d 179.
—When not demanded.
Fact that plaintiff did not ask for attorney
fees in his complaint did not preclude trial
court from awarding them to him since this rule
indicates that there shall be liberality of procedure to reach result which justice requires.
Palombi v. D & C Bldrs., 22 Utah 2d 297, 452
R2d 325 (1969).
District court's award of attorney fees in
excess of the fees demanded in the complaint
and of costs where no costs were demanded was
proper where the proof at trial showed the
party was entitled to such relief. Pope v. Pope,
589 P2d 752 (Utah 1978).
Default judgments.
Subdivision (c)(2) and Rule 55 prescribes the
procedure to be followed by trial courts in
entering judgments against defaulting parties,
and courts are not at liberty to deviate from
those rules just because one party is in default
and is not entitled to be heard on the merits of
the case. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193
(Utah 1984).
Effect of partial final judgment.
The entry of a final judgment as to fewer than
all of the parties or claims does not affect the
ability of the district court to proceed with
respect to the remainder of the claims and
parties; and when an appeal is taken from such
a judgment, it only brings before the Supreme
Court that portion of the action with respect to
which the judgment has been entered, and the
rest of the action remains in the trial court and
is not necessarily affected by the appeal. Lane
v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1984).
Fi&al order.
—Appealability.
The final judgment rule, Subdivision (b), applies when the trial court orders a separate
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, and failure to have the case
certified as final by the trial court, leaving
issues and parties before that court, will deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction over an
appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298
(Utah 1991).
Appeal of an order that was not final and
neither certified nor eligible for certification
under Subdivision (b) was not properly taken,
and the remedy was dismissal of the appeal.
A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 R2d
323 (Utah 1991).
Defendants, who did not seek permission to
file an interlocutory appeal under Rule 5 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and who
had, because no final judgment had been entered in the cases, alternative avenues under
Rules 54(b) and 65B(e) of the Utah Rules of
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Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 55, ER.C.P
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Damages.
Divorce action.
Entry of default not warranted.
Failure to plead.
Judgment.
—Conduct of counsel.
—Default entry necessary.
—Failure to follow rule.
—Hearing on merits.
—Punitive damages.
Notice.
Setting aside default.
—Collateral attack.
—Direct attack.
—Discretion of court.
—Grounds.
Excusable neglect.
—Judicial attitude.
—Movant's duty.
—Setting aside proper.
Time for appeal.
Cited.
Damages.
A default judgment establishes, as a matter
of law, that defendants are liable to plaintiff as
to each cause of action alleged in the complaint.
Nevertheless, it is still incumbent upon the
nondefaulting party to establish by competent
evidence the amount of recoverable damages
and costs he claims. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
There is no right to a jury trial on the issue of
damages once default has been entered. Arnica
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
To enter a default judgment for unliquidated
damages, a judge must review the complaint,
determine whether the allegations state a valid
claim for relief, and award damages in an
amount that is supported by some valid evidence. Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d
1071 (Utah 1998).
Divorce action.
Defendant who failed to file answer in divorce action was not entitled to hearing or
notice before entry of default divorce decree
even though 90-day statutory period had not
elapsed. Heath v. Heath, 541 P2d 1040 (Utah
1975).
Entry of default not warranted.
This rule requires an entry of default against
a defendant who fails to appear only if the
well-pled facts show that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff
who alleged that the defendant provided necessary and reasonable medical services to the
plaintiff in one count and then sought a declaratory judgment in another count alleging the

Failure to plead.
In an action for modification of the custody
provision in a divorce decree, it was appropriate for the trial court to rule on appellee's
petition, absent any responsive pleading, and
to accept the allegations in the petition as true
in resolving the threshold requirement of
whether appellant's circumstances had materially changed; however, it does not follow that
appellee's petition entitled her to relief. A trial
court asked to render a judgment by default
must first conclude that the uncontroverted
allegations of an applicant's petition are, on
their face, legally sufficient to establish a valid
claim against the defaulting party Stevens v.
Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
modified on other grounds, 863 P.2d 534 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).
Judgment.
Judgments by default are not favored by the
courts nor are they in the interest of justice and
fair play. Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14
Utah 2d 60, 377 P2d 189 (1962).
—Conduct of counsel.
When defendant's counsel was 27 minutes
late on morning trial was commenced because
he was unable to obtain from the Supreme
Court a writ of prohibition to prevent the holding of the trial on that day due to absence of
defense witnesses, the trial court erred in
granting a default judgment to plaintiff and
refusing to allow defense counsel to participate
in the proceedings or challenge plaintiff's evidence, notwithstanding any ill-advised, irritating or contemptuous conduct from defense
counsel during the action, since the law prefers
that afcasebe tried on its merits and the parties
litigant should not be made to suffer for the
misconduct of their counsel. McKean v. Mountain View Mem. Estates, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 323,
411 P2d 129 (1966).
—Default entry necessary.
No default judgment may be entered under
Subdivision (b)(2) unless default has previously
been entered. The entry of default is an essential predicate to any default judgment. P & B
Land, Inc. v. Klungervik, 751 P2d 274 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
—Failure to follow rule.
Rule 54(c)(2) and this rule prescribe the procedure to be followed by trial courts in entering
judgments against defaulting parties, and
courts are not at liberty to deviate from those
rules just because one party is in default and is
not entitled to be heard on the merits of the
case. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah
1984).
Judgment against defaulting party must be

Jason Cody
ProSe
P.O. Box 9732
Ogden,UT 84409
Phone: (801)627-1182
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND OF WEBER
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
Jason Cody
Plaintiff,
VS.
Willard Lowe,

NOTICE TO MAKE ENTRY
OF DEFAULT BY
DEFENDANT
Civil Case No. 070902903 MI

Defendant.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE
ERNIE W. JONES

Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and he requests that in accordance
with the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule No. 55, the court clerk MAKE
AN ENTRY OF DEFAULT BY THE DEFENDANT, in the above entitled action, this 51
day of July 2007.
Defendant was personally served with the 20 DAY SUMMONS and the
AMENDED COMPLAINT on June 11, 2007.
The time has tolled ant the 20 days have expired with no answer or response by
the Defendant, thus it is proper to make entry of Judgment by Default in favor of the
Plaintiff, at this time.

ORDER
The request having been made by Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and good cause
appearing, the Clerk of the Second District Court hereby enters a Judgment By Default
against the Defendant, Willard Lowe, and in favor of the Plaintiff, Jason Cody on this
day of July 2007, for all claims made by Plaintiff in this action.
BY THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Dated this

day of July 2007.

Second District Court Clerk
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Jason Cody
ProSe
P.O. Box 9732
Ogden,UT 84409
Phone: (801)627-1182
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND OF WEBER
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
Jason Cody
Plaintiff,
VS.

ORDER AWARDING
JUDGEMENT FOR PLAINTIFF
BY DEFAULT OF DEFENDANT
Civil Case No. 070902903 MI

Willard Lowe,
Defendant.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE
ERNIE W. JONES

On June 11,2007, Defendant Willard Lowe was personally served with a 20
DAY SUMMONS and a copy of the complaint filed with the court by Plaintiff, Jason
Cody, in the above entitled matter.
Time having tolled and the 20 day period for Defendant to file an answer to the
complaint having expired on July 02,2007, with no answer or responsefiledwith the
court by Defendant.
Now therefore, in accordance with the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
Rule 55, addressing Judgment by Default, Plaintiff, Jason Cody, hereby requests that
Judgment by Default be entered by the Court, in favor of the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, in this
matter at this time, July 05,2007, for all Plaintiffs claims.

ORDER
For the forgoing reasons, and good cause appearing, the court in accordance with
Rule 55 of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, hereby grants Plaintiffs request
and hereby enters Judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Jason Cody, on all of the claims made
in the complaint by Plaintiff, Jason Cody.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated this

day of July 2007.

Second District Court Clerk

Page 2

Jason Cody
ProSe
P.O. Box 9732
Ogden,UT 84409
Phone: (801)627-1182
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Jason Cody
Inmate #215687
W.C.C.F.
Medical Cell M6
P.O. Box 14000
Ogden,UT 84412
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND OF WEBER
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
Jason Cody
Plaintiff,
VS.
Willard Lowe,

EXPARTE MOTION SUBMITTING
PREPARED ORDER FOR
FINAL JUDGMENT
Civil Case No. 070902903 MI

Defendant.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE
ERNIE W. JONES

Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and he hereby submits this ORDER
for FINAL JUDGMENT prepared in accordance with The Utah Rules For Civil
Procedure, Rules 54 and 55.
The court may utilize this PREPARED ORDER, if it chooses to do so, to wholly
dispose of all claims in this case at this time. Pursuant to the requirement of Rule 54(b),
and solely for the purpose to allow the court to make a FINAL JUDGMENT in this
action, the Plaintiff hereby waives his request for award of Punitive Damages in this
action at this time. The Plaintiff only requests award of actual damages claimed in the

amount certain of $50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Dollars), plus costs in amounts of $155.00
(One Hundred Fifty Five Dollars) filing fee and $30.00 (Thirty Dollars) process service
fee, for a total award in the amount certain of $50,185.00 (Fifty Thousand One Hundred
Eighty Five Dollars). To be the FINAL JUDGMENT award, disposing of this case. In
the event that such Judgment is set aside for any reason, then too the Plaintiffs waiver of
attorney's fees and Punitive Damages will also be nullified and withdrawn at the same
time the Judgment is set aside.
Dated this 9th day of July 2007.
Mr. Jason Cody
ProSe
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Jason Cody
ProSe
P.O. Box 9732
Ogden,UT 84409
Phone: (801)627-1182
Jason Cody
Inmate #215687
W.C.C.F.
Medical Cell M6
P.O. Box 14000
Ogden, UT 84412
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND OF WEBER
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
Jason Cody
Plaintiff,

!

ORDER FOR FINAL JUDGMENT

VS.
Willard Lowe,

Civil Case No. 070902903 MI
Defendant.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE
ERNIE W. JONES

Upon MOTION of the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and good cause appearing,
The Court hereby ORDERS Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, for actual
Damages in the amount of $50,000 (Fifty Thousand Dollars) and costs of filing fee,
$155.00 (One Hundred Fifty Five Dollars), and costs of Process Service, $30.00 (Thirty
Dollars), with $10.00 (Ten Dollars) awarded for attorney's feels and $0.00 (Zero Dollars)
Awarded for Punitive Damages, for a total award of $50,185.00 (Fifty Thousand One
Hundred Eighty Five Dollars), as FINAL JUDGMENT in this action.
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Dated this

day of July 2007.

BY THE COURT
Ernie W. Jones
District Court Judge
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Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise
directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for
the entry of judgment In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating ail the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that
specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment
(d) Costs.
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah,
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as
served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any
interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof m a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
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Rule 55. Default
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend
as provided by these rules and that fad is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b) Judgment Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against
the defendant if:
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear;
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person;
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation.
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, \n
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine
the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other
matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by
default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state
of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim orrightto relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court.
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In The Second Judicial District Court In and For
Weber County, State of Utah
Ogden Department

NOTICE TO SUBMIT
Motion to order clerk to make Entry of
Default by the defendant Nunc Pro Tunc
to MyiS^ 2007

Jason Cody
Plaintiff
VS

Civil No. 070902903 mi

Willard Lowe

Judge Ernie W. Jones

Defendant

Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and he requests that his motion to
order the clerk to make Entry of Default by the defendant Nunc Pro Tunc to July 5th 2007
filed July 20th 2007 now be submitted to the court for decision.
Dated this 27th day of August, 2007
Jas/ifi'Cody Pro Se,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice to submit, by
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon attorney for the defendant, Branden B-Miles, 2380
Washington Blvd, Suite 230, Ogden, Utah 84401.
Dated this 27th day of August, 2007

Jason Cody Pro Se
P.O. Box 9732
Ogden, Utah 84409
Phone (801)627-1182

In The Second Judicial District Court In and For
Weber County, State of Utah
Ogden Department

NOTICE TO SUBMIT
Motion to schedule a hearing to
determine the amount of damages to
which plaintiff is entitled

Jason Cody
Plaintiff
VS

Civil No. 070902903 mi

Willard Lowe

Judge Ernie W. Jones

Defendant

Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and he requests that his motion to
schedule a hearing to determine the amount of damages to which plaintiff is filed July
20th 2007 now be submitted to the court for decision.
7th

Dated this 27m day of August, 2007
Jason Cody Pro Se
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice to submit, by
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon attorney for the defendant, Branden B-Miles, 2380
Washington Blvd, Suite 230, Ogden, Utah 84401.
7th

Dated this 27m day of August, 2007

^zf^.
Jasop^Zody Pro Se

^23

Jason Cody Pro Se
P.O. Box 9732
Ogden, Utah 84409
Phone (801)627-1182

In The Second Judicial District Court In and For
Weber County, State of Utah
Ogden Department

NOTICE TO SUBMIT
Motion for leave of the court
to amend complaint

Jason Cody
Plaintiff
VS

Civil No. 070902903 mi

Willard Lowe

Judge Ernie W. Jones
Defendant

Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and he requests that his motion for
leave of the court to amend complaint filed July 20th 2007 now be submitted to the court
for decision.
Dated this 27th day of August, 2007
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice to submit, by
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon attorney for the defendant, Branden B-Miles, 2380
Washington Blvd, Suite 230, Ogden, Utah 84401.
Dated this 27th day of August, 2007

Jason Cody Pro Se
P.O. Box 9732
Ogden, Utah 84409
Phone (801)627-1182

In The Second Judicial District Court In and For
Weber County, State of Utah
Ogden Department

NOTICE TO SUBMIT
Defendants motion to consolidate

Jason Cody
Plaintiff
VS

Civil No. 070902903 mi

Willard Lowe

Judge Ernie W. Jones
Defendant

Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and in accordance with the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7 d, he requests that defendants motion to consolidate,
filed July 26th 2007 by defendants attorney Branden B-Miles, and the memorandum in
oppositionfiledby plaintiff Jason Cody Pro Se on or about August 13th 2007now be
submitted to the court for decision.
Dated this 27th day of August, 2007

J/j>/)i7*<Jasotf Codv
i /
.ody Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice to submit, by
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon attorney for the defendant, Branden B-Miles, 2380
Washington Blvd, Suite 230, Ogden, Utah 84401.
Dated this 27th day of August, 2007
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BRANDEN B. MILES, UBN #9777
2830 WASHINGTON BLVD., SUITE 230
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377

&

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
)

JASON CODY

)
)

Plaintiff
v.

) MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF
)
)

WILLARD LOWE
and

) Case No. 07090293 MI (Lowe)
) Judge Ernie W. Jones
)
)

RENEE HANCOCK
Defendants

) Case No. 070902904 MI (Hancock)
) Judge Roger S. Dutson
)

1
Plaintiff respectfully moves this Court to consolidate the two cases into one case pursuant
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 42. The reasons supporting this consolidation are
explained below.
FACTS
On May 18, 2006, the plaintiff, Jason Brad Cody, brutally assaulted Willard Lowe and
Renee Hancock in front of their home. During a dispute over the location of a potted tree, the
plaintiff punched Willard Lowe, a 74-year-old man who weighed about 125 pounds, in the
stomach, causing him to fall to the ground. Once Mr. Lowe fell to the ground, the plaintiff, who
was 56-years-old and weighed more than 200 pounds, jumped on top of Mr. Lowe and pinned his
arms underneath him. From this position, the plaintiff repeatedly punched, slapped, and slammed

1

Mr. Lowe's head onto the asphalt of the roadway. Renee Hancock, 69-years-old, observed the
plaintiff punching Mr. Lowe and ran out to help. Ms. Hancock attempted to pull the plaintiff off
of Mr. Lowe, but the plaintiff seized her hand and bit down, breaking a bone and severing a
tendon in her finger.
Eventually a neighbor pulled the plaintiff off of Mr. Lowe, and the police were called.
The police and medical personnel arrived to treat Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock, and both were
transported to a hospital. Mr. Lowe sustained multiple abrasions to his head, his eye was severely
swollen, and he was bleeding profusely from various cuts in his head. Ms. Hancock was treated
for the broken bone in her hand and had a tendon partially severed in her pinky. She has since
undergone physical therapy but continues to have problems with numbness and her ability to
hold things with that hand. The plaintiff had no serious injuries.
The plaintiff was charged with Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony; Assault with
Substantial Bodily Injury, a class A misdemeanor; and Criminal Mischief, a class A
misdemeanor. Information on the criminal case can be found under case number 061902461.
On February 15, 2007, after the evidence was heard during a non-jury trial, the Plaintiff
was found guilty beyond all reasonable doubt for these offenses. On April 2, the Plaintiff was
sentenced to a suspended prison sentence with formal probation and 180 days in the Weber
County Jail. He is currently an inmate at the jail.
Around June 1, 2007, the plaintiff filed two separate claims against Willard Lowe and
Renee Hancock. Each claim cited against both defendants causes of action of harassment,
malicious mischief, obstruction of justice, perjury, submitting false claims, conspiracy to commit
perjury and obstruction of justice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious
2

prosecution. The facts alleged under each claim in both complaints are, overwhelmingly,
identical. Specifically, the facts supporting the causes of action of submitting false claim,
obstruction of justice, perjury, conspiracy to commit obstruction of justice and perjury, malicious
prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are verbatim.
The causes of action for harassment and malicious mischief also contain factual
allegations that are nearly identical. Under the cause of action for harassment, the plaintiff alleges
that both defendants caused a potted tree and a truck to be placed in the roadway near the
plaintiffs driveway. Further, under the cause of action for malicious mischief, the plaintiff
alleges that both defendants caused water damage to the plaintiffs shed and caused paint
scratches on the plaintiffs car. The only variations between the two complaints are where the
plaintiff alleges, first, that Renee Hancock is liable to him for making false statement to a mobile
home park organization and for spreading moth balls, and, second, that Willard Lowe is liable to
him for assault, trespass, and taking "unwelcome" photographs.

3

ARGUMENT
I.

THE ACTIONS BROUGHT AGAINST WILLARD LOWE AND RENEE
HANCOCK SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED BECAUSE EACH ACTION
PRESENTS NEARLY IDENTICAL QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT.
A court may consolidate actions involving a common question of law or fact in order to

avoid unnecessary costs or delay.1 Utah R. Civ. P. 42(a). Trial courts have broad discretion in
deciding motions to consolidate. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 105 P. 3d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).
Here, at first glance, the plaintiffs complaints against both Willard Lowe and Renee
Hancock present nearly identical questions of both law and fact. Legally, the plaintiff alleges that
both Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock are liable to him for the same eight claims: harassment,
malicious mischief, obstruction of justice, perjury, submitting false claims, conspiracy to commit
perjury and obstruction of justice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious
prosecution. Further, under the plaintiffs cause of action heading of "harassment," an additional
claim of private nuisance was identified given the facts alleged.
Factually, each claim is supported by nearly identical facts. The facts supporting the
plaintiffs claims against both Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock for obstruction of justice, perjury,
conspiracy, submitting false claims, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious
prosecution are verbatim. Similarly, under the plaintiffs claim of harassment, identical facts are

1 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 42, reads as follows: "(a) When actions involving a common question of law or
fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions;
it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay. (1) A motion to consolidate cases shall be heard by the judge assigned to the first
case Notice of a motion to consolidate cases shall be given to all parties in each case. The order denying or granting
the motion shall be filed in each case. (2) If a motion to consolidate is granted, the case number of thefirstcase filed
shall be used for al subsequent papers and the case shall be heard by the judge assigned to the first case. The
presiding judge may assigned the case to another judge for good cause." Utah R. Civ. P. 42.
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presented regarding a potted tree and a truck parked on a street.2 Further, under the plaintiffs
claim for malicious mischief, identical facts are presented regarding water damage to the
plaintiffs shed and paint scratches to the plaintiffs car.
The only differences between the two complaints are found under the claims for
harassment and malicious mischief. First, under the plaintiffs claim for harassment, Ms.
Hancock is accused of making false accusations to a mobile home park organization; Mr. Lowe,
on the other hand, is accused of assault, trespass, and taking "unwelcome" photographs of the
plaintiff. Second, under the plaintiffs claim for malicious mischief, Ms. Hancock is again
accused of making false statements to a mobile park organization and of spreading moth balls3;
Mr. Lowe is again accused of assault.
These differences are superficial at most. The plaintiffs complaints against both Mr.
Lowe and Ms. Hancock can be traced back to two common events: first, a common-place dispute
between neighbors, and, second, a criminal trial where the plaintiff was found guilty of brutally
assaulting both Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock. Yet even these two events are related
because a neighborly dispute over the location of a potted tree is what caused the plaintiff to
assault the defendants.
The majority of the plaintiffs claims against Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock-specifically,
those claims of obstruction of justice, perjury, conspiracy, submitting false claim, malicious
prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress-are related to the criminal

2 These are the claims which could constitute private nuisance.
3 That Renee Hancock allegedly spread moth balls is another accusation the defense will assume could be
considered a private nuisance.

5

proceedings in which the plaintiff was prosecuted for assaulting Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock.
Logically, since these claims against Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock arise out of a single criminal
trial, the two are factually related and should, therefore, be consolidated.
The remaining claims of harassment and malicious mischief are related to the property
dispute between these neighbors. Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock share a home which once
neighbored the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has identified both Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock, not just
one or the other, as the persons responsible for his alleged harm. Thus, logically, these claims are
also factually related. Additionally, in both of the plaintiffs complaints against Mr. Lowe and
Ms. Hancock, the plaintiff referred to other persons such as "guest[s]" and "friend[s]" though the
plaintiff does not further identify those persons. However, given the nearly identical facts and the
similarity of the charges alleged in both complaints, it can logically be inferred that the plaintiff
was referring to Mr. Lowe in his complaint against Ms. Hancock and referring to Ms. Hancock in
his complaint against Mr. Lowe. Because this neighborly dispute involves both Mr. Lowe and
Ms. Hancock it seems only logical that the two actions should be consolidated.
Furthermore, by consolidating these cases, this court would avoid unnecessary costs,
delay, and inconvenience, not only to the defendants but to the plaintiff as well since both would
only need to be concerned about one hearing instead of two. Additionally, rather than using
already sparse judicial resources by assigning the plaintiffs claims to two separate judges this
case would only be assigned to a single judge.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the plaintiffs claims against Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock should be
consolidated because both present nearly identical questions of both law and fact. Legally, the
6

plaintiffs complaint against both Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock are nearly identical as both involve
causes of action of harassment, malicious mischief, obstruction of justice, perjury, submitting
false claims, conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and
private nuisance. Factually, under each cause of action the plaintiff alleges facts against both Mr.
Lowe and Ms. Hancock that are verbatim. Logically, the plaintiffs complaints against Mr. Lowe
and Ms. Hancock arise out of a single criminal trial or a neighborly dispute: both are factually
related and both involve Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock.
Dated this'"/? 5

day of July, 2007.

/

Branden B. Miles
Deputy Weber County Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I mailed on the ALP day of July, 2007, a copy of the foregoing MOTION
TO CONSOLIDATE to:
Mr. Jason Cody
Inmate No. 215687
Medical Cell M6
Weber County Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 14000
Ogden, Utah 84412
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JASON CODY,
Plaintiff,

COURT'S RULING REGARDING MOTION
TO CONSOLIDATE

vs.

Case No: 070902903

WILLARD LOWE,
Defendant.

Judge: ERNIE W JONES
Date:
September 24, 2007

A motion to consolidate this case with another case assigned to
Roger S. Dutson was filed by Attorney Branden Miles on July 26,
2007. A notice to submit for decision was submitted September 17,
2007. The Court finds that there is no reason to consolidate this
case because this case was dismissed for failure to state claim on
August 23, 2007. Judge Dutson has also indicated that he intends to
dismiss the other case. The motion to consolidate is, therefore,
denied.

^L
Judge ERNIE W JONES]

Page 1

Case No: 070902903
Date:
Sep 24, 2007
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 070902903 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

JASON CODY
Plaintiff
P O BOX 9732
OGDEN, UT 844090732
BRANDEN B MILES
Attorney DEF
23 80 WASHINGTON BLVD STE 230
OGDEN UT 844 01

Mail

Dated t h i s

d a y of

NAME

SEP 2 4 2007
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Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the courts initiative; and, unless otherwise
directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than ail of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for
the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entittedfeven if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that
specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah,
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as
served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any
interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof m a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
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Rule 55- Default
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend
as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against
the defendant if :
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear;
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person;
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation.
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine
the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other
matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by
default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state
of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court.
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CASE NUMBER 070902904 Miscellaneous
Securities
bonniejs
21-07 Note: Left message with Ursula Cody at phone number on
documents that Plaintiff failed to have a certificate of
mailing on documents.
vickiv
06-04-07 Filed: Notice to Submit Prepared Order Waiving Plaintiff's
Fees, Costs, And Securities
vickiv
06-04-07 Filed: Prepared Order Waiving Plaintiff's Fees, Costs, And
Securites
vickiv
06-04-07 Note: Rec: Order Waiving Plaintiff Fees, Costs, And Securitiesvickiv
06-14-07 Filed: Amended Complaint Of: Harassment, Malicious Mischief,
Obstruction Of Justice, Perjury, Submited False Claims,
Conspiracy To Commit Perjury And Obstruction Of Justice, And
Intentional Infliction Of Extreme Emotional Distress, Malicious
Prose
vickiv
06-14-07 Filed: Summons
vickiv
06-14-07 Filed: Notice to Submit Affidavit Of Impecuniosity
vickiv
06-14-07 Filed: Affidavit Of Impecuniosity
vickiv
06-14-07 Filed return: Summons and Complaint (No Summons attached)
trinaw
Party Served: HANCOCK, RENAE
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 11, 2007
06-19-07 Note: File to RSD
vickiv
06-21-07 Filed order: Order Denying Waiver of Fees
cariel
Judge rdutson
Signed June 21, 2007
06-21-07 Filed: Order Waiving Court Fees filed unigned per 06/21/2007
order
cariel
0
5-07 Filed: Complaint No Amount
mariag
07-05-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
155.00
mariag
07-05-07 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
Payment Received:
155.00
mariag
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
07-05-07 Note: Rec: Order Awarding Judgment For Plaintiff By Default Of
Defendant
vickiv
07-05-07 Note: File to RSD
vickiv
07-05-07 Filed: Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim
vickiv
Filed by: HANCOCK, RENAE
07-05-07 Tracking started for Motion. Review date Nov 08, 2007.
vickiv
07-05-07 Filed: Answer
vickiv
RENAE HANCOCK
07-10-07 Note: Address changed from P 0 BOX 9732
OGDEN
UT 84409-0732
vickiv
07-10-07 Note: Address changed to WCCF
#215687 P.O. BOX 14000 OGDEN UT
84412
vickiv
07-10-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 070902904 ID 10089087
vickiv
We are unable to enter the default judgment/certificate in this
case for the following reasons:
An Answer has been filed by the defendant.
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CASE NUMBER 070902903 Miscellaneous

05-17 -07 Note: Address changed from
bonniejs
17 -07 Note: Address changed to 4375 WEBER RIVER DR #60 OTDEN UT
bonniejs
84405
debbiekc
05-31 -07 Tracking started for Motion. Review date Jul 17, 2007.
05-31 -07 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Jul 31,
debbiekc
2007.
debbiekc
05-31 -07 Note: HOLD JUNE 1
06-04 -07 Filed: Notice to Submit prepared order waiving plaintiffs
debbiekc
fee ! s costs and securities
06-04-07 Filed: Prepared order waiving plaintiffs fees costs and
securities
debbiekc
debbiekc
06-04' •07 Filed: Summons - PROOF OF SERVICE NOT ATTACHED TO SUMMONS
06-04- •07 Filed: Amended complaint of Harassment, Malicious Mischief,
Obstruction of Justice, Perjury, Submitting Fase Claims,
Conspiracy to commit Perjury and Obstruction of Justice and
Intentional Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress, Maliciou:
Prosec
debbiekc
06-04- 07 Note: Rec Order waiving plaintiffs fees costs and securities
debbiekc
06-06- 07 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Aug 05,
2007.
debbiekc
06-12- 07 Note: FILE TO EWJ: ORDER WAIVING PLAINTIFFS FEE'S
debbiekc
debbiek
06-12- 07 Tracking ended for Motion.
debbiek
06-12- 07 Tracking ended for Under advisement.
06-12- 07 Tracking - Under advisement, changed to Review date Aug 12,
2007.
debbiekc
06-14- 07 Filed return: Proof of Service -Summons not attached to proof debbiekc
Party Served: WILLARD LOWE
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 11, 2007
06-14 -07 Filed Notice to Submit Exparte Affidavit of Impecuniosity
debbiekc
06-14 -07 Filed Affidavit of impecuniosity
debbiekc
0 6 - 1 5 -07 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Aug 14,
2007.
debbiekc
06-18- 07 Note: Filing fee waiver denied by Judge Jones. Plaintiff must
pay filing fee in full before any further pleadings may be
filed.
vennaw
06-18- 07 Note: Order waiving plaintiff ! s fees, costs and securities
vennaw
filed unsigned, denied by Judge Jones.
06-28- 07 Tracking ended for Under advisement.
debbiek
06-28- 07 Tracking ended for Under advisement.
debbiek
07-05- 07 Filed: Complaint No Amount
mariag
07-05- 07 Fee Account created
mariag
155.00
Total Due:
07-05- 07 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
mariag
155.00
Payment Received:
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
r
07-05- 07 Filed: Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
debbiekc
/^Filed by: MILES, BRANDEN B
07-05- 07 Filed: Answer
debbiekc
WILLARD LOWE
f
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CASE NUMBER 070902903 Miscellaneous
07-05-07 Note: Rec Notice to make entry of default by defendant & order
05-07 Note: Rec Order awarding Judgment for plaintiff by default of
defendant
07-09-07 Filed return: (copy Duplicate) Affidavit of Service
Party Served: WILLARD LOWE
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 11, 2007
07-10-07 Filed: Ex parte Motion submitting prepared order for final
Judgment
Filed by: CODY, JASON
07-10-07 Filed: Notice to Submit Exparte Motion for Final Judgment
07-10-07 Note: Rec Order of Judgment in Favor of the plaintiff
07-12-07 Filed: Certificate of Service
07-12-07 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Sep 10,
2007.
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Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise
directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for
the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitlecT/even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that
specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah,
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as
served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any
interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not
included \n the judgment, insert the amount thereof In a blank left \n the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
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Rule 55. Default
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend
as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against
the defendant if:
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear ;
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person;
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation.
(b)(2) By the court, in all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine
the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other
matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by
default has been entered, may likewise set it aside m accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In ail
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state
of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court.
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Jason Cody
ProSe
P.O. Box 9732
Ogden,Utah 84409
Phone:(801)627-1182
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
Jason Cody
Plaintiff,
V.
Willard Lowe
Defendant.

Amended Complaint Of:
Harassment, Malicious Mischief,
Obstruction of Justice, Perjury,
Submitting False Claims, Conspiracy
To Commit Perjury and Obstruction
of Justice, Intentional Infliction of
Extreme Emotional Distress, and
Abusive and Malicious Prosecution
Civil Case No. 070902903 MI
The Honorable Judge
Ernie W. Jones

Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and he complains against Defendant
and alleges as follows:
FERST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Harassment)
1. Defendant engaged in actions to hamss Plaintiff by making various gestures at
Plaintiff and by calling Plaintiff vulgar names and using obscene language.
2. Defendant caused a potted tree to be placed in the roadway near to Plaintiffs
driveway to make it difficult for Plaintiff to access and egress his driveway.
3. Defendant parked his pickup track with large camper shell in the roadway at

the end of Plaintiffs driveway making it dangerous for Plaintiff to exit his driveway due
to the obstructed view. This was contrary to the Park's rules.
4. Defendant further harassed P l a k ^
leased property after he had been told not to trespass.
5. Defendant harassed Plaintiff by taking unwelcome photos of the Plaintiff and
his spouse and their home and cars.
FIRST CAUSE ADBENDUMS
1. Beginning 8:30 PM, June 25,2005, Defendant called Plaintiff, "The strangest
fbcker I have ever seen." At approximately 8:00 PM on May 1,2006, Defendant told
Plaintiff, "you're an asshole." I have the first instance recorded on audio tape, for the
second I have to eye and ear witnesses. There were several other occasions when he
called me "Asshole" or "you're a fbcker*, but I have no evidence other than my
testimony. On many occasions between June 26,2005 and May 18,2006, the Defendant
shook his fist at me, orflippedme the bird (meaning "fuck you"), or pointed his right
hand indexfingerat me imitating a handgun and would drop his extended thumb like the
hammer on a pistol pretending to shoot me. This behavior was witnessed by four other
people besides myself They are Ursula Cody, Gary Klema, Joe Gold, and Leroy Eck.
Hie gesture of pretending to shoot me with a pistol was especially disturbing as I
knew that Renee Hancock had testified in Judge Heffeman's court in December of 2005
that at the urging of Mr. Lowe, she had acquired a concealed weapon carry permit, which
led me to believe that both, she and Mr. Lowe, were both armed with handguns, and she
testified that she had obtained the carry peimit specifically to protect herselffromme, the
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Plaintiff^ and that was of great concern to me as I believed I had two people next door that
were off theirrockerwith paranoid delusions about me and they were both likely armed
when allowing themselves to be in my proximity. I was afiaid that these old looneys
could shoot me in the back at anytime because ofthe irrational fear they expressed they
had of me. I have witnesses who can testify that I told them of my very deep concern.
2. The only plansible explanation for this is that they were intentionally harassing
me by potting this potted tree in the roadway, not on Ms. Hancock's leased property, but
in the public roadway and ostensibly at the direction of Annette Wright, the property
manager for the trailer park, who has been trying to evict me since the spring of 2002.
3. However, when I complained to the park manager that this behavior was
endangering people, especially children, on Inly 6,2005, she apparently took no action to
alleviate the situation as I was able to take photos of Mr. Lowe's track being improperly
parked and causing this hazard for over 30 consecutive days in July and August of 2005.
I can also produce several eye witnesses, such as Joe Gold, Nicholas Stone, Ursula Cody,
Charles Leverton, Gary Kiema, Leroy Eck, Mark Lucas, Marianne Brunker, etc.
4. This occurred in the summer months of 2005 for the most part, and was done
to aggravate me. I even have one photo of Mr. Low7e standing in my driveway on the
wrong side of a no trespassing sign on the afternoon of July 28,2005 at approximately 2
PM. There were witnesses as well, but I have a photo and an audio recording of myself
telling Mr. Lowe to cease trespassing while he continued to ignore me and remained on
my property. When I complained to the park manager, she said it was minor and I should
tolerate it. She did nothing to stop it, so I went to the city police and complained and
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showed them the photo. They took the photo for evidence and said they wouldfilea
report, hot nothing wm done to stop it other than an officer spoke to Mr. Lowe and told
Mm not to trespass anymore. Mr. Lowe denied trespassing and told the officer that there
was no wa> for him to be certain that what I was claiming as my driveway might not be a
part of my leased property and ft could even be pari of his girlfriend's (Renee Hancock)
leased property. Mr. Lowe wanted to see my property deed and unbelievably the police
officer agreed with him. I was so frustrated that I walked away.
5. Again he did this to aggravate me and I took a few photos of him doing tMs at
A arions tunes during 2005 sml thefirst4 and M months of 2006, birt the best one is a
video I recorded on my camcorder on Ma> 1S> 2006> immediately prior to Mr. Lowe's
attack on me (also on video) at about 5 in the afternoon.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Malicious Mischief)
1. Defendant Is responsible for damage to Plaintiffs vehicle, (scratches in the
paint), b; causing his friend's front yard gate to open and strike Plaintiffs vehicle while it
was parked in Plaintiffs driveway.
2. Defendant caused damage to Plaintiff's property by watering a shed wall of the
Plaintiff's while watering his friend's yard.
3. Defendant.without provocations, attacked and physically assaulted Plaintiff
while Plaintiff was standing at the end of his driveway, a very short while later,
Defendant's friend joined in the assault of the Plaintiff.
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SECOND CAUSE ADDENDUMS
1. I have the date and time this occurred during the late summer of 2005, as well
as a photo showing the open gate against my track and Mr. Lowe mowing the lawn of
Renee Hancock who saw me take the picture and closed her gate as soon as I had walked
away.
2. I have photos ofthis as well as documentation of the dates are displayed in the
photos. I also have date documented photos of the black mold caused by the watering,
depicting the extensive damage to my wooden shed and can produce eye witnesses to
both the watering ofthe shed which never took place prior to July 2005 and the damage
resulting, these witnesses are Ursula Cody, Wayne Burrows, and Leroy Eck.
3. Oa May 18,2006, at about 5:00 PM, the Defendant assaulted and battered the
Plaintiff by knocking Plaintiffs camcorder into his face causing two bruises and
subsequently struck Plaintiff numerous times attempting to strike Plaintiff in his groin
and then bit the Plaintiff s hand causing a great deal of pain as well as two puncture
wounds and a laceration from Defendant's teeth. Defendant was joined in this attack on
the Plaintiff by his friend Renee Hancock. Paragraphs 2 and 3 were done with malicious
aforethought, perhaps paragraph 1 also.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Obstruction of Justice)
1. Defendant has provided false erroneous information and statements to the
police in attempts to cause problems for the Plaintiff and causing Plaintiff to be arrested
and jailed by the city police.
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2, Defendant has provided false and erroneous information to the courts causing
them to take action against the Plaintiff.
THIRD CAUSE ADDENDUMS
1. On May 18.2006. in the late afternoon. Defendant gave statements to
Rtverdale Police concerning an altercation with the Plaintiff that had just occurred at
about 5:00 PM. These statements were false and accused the Plaintiff of crimes which he
did not commit. On the basis of the statements of the Defendant the Plaintiff was
arrested and jailed at that time, Defendant stated that Plaintiff attacked when truly
Willard Lowe attacked Plaintiff.
2. Defendant gave the same false information infourdifferent court hearings and
trials, wherein based upon this false information the courts made deeisions adverse to the
Plaintiff The courts were; Judge Hadley-June. 2006: Judge Morris Preliminary-Summer
2006: Judge Dutson-Oeioher 2006 and Judge Moms-February 15, 2007, Defendant also
gave false testimony in Judge Heffernan's court in December of 2005. but no adverse
action was taken against Plaintiff, Defendant's false information included alleged
damage of a camera, eye glasses and hearing aid.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Perjury)
1. Defendant has sworn to false information in affidavits.
2. Defendant has given false testimony to the courts on several occasions
concerning the Plaintiff
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FOURTH CAUSE ADDENDUMS
1. Defendant provided an affidavit in Judge Hadley's court in June 2006, wherein
Defendant falsely st^tod that Plaintiff attacked Defendant without provocation on May 18,
2006. Plaintiff has a video recording of part of the incident which clearly proves that
Willard Lowe attacked Jason Cody.
2. Defendant has falsely accused Plaintiff of allegations against Plaintiff first
provided in the witness and/or victims statement to Riverdale City Police on May 18,
2006, and May 19.2006. Defendant has committed this perjury in four different court
hearings and trials: Judge Hadley's court on or about June 21, 2006; Judge Morris5 court
preliminary hearing on assault charges filed against Plaintiff in the summer of 2006,
Judge Dutson\s court on or about October 4, 2006, and Judge Morris' court on or about
February 15,2007,
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Submitting False Claims)
1. Defendant has submitted false erroneous claims to the court with regard to
medical expenses and damaged property replacement through restitution.
FIFTH CAUSE ADDENDUMS
1. Defendant, Willard Lowe, alleged Plaintiff intentionally caused damage to his
$250.00 (Two Hundred Fifty Dollar) eyeglasses on May 18, 2006 as well as his $1500.00
(One Thousand Five Hundred Dollar) hearing aid and his,first$300,00 (Three Hundred
Dollar) then $400.00 (Four Hundred Dollar), friend's digital camera. Defendant. Willard
Lowe, also initially claimed that Plaintiff had caused him a broken nose. Hefileda claim
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with Judge Morris' court some time in February or March 2007, through Adult Probation
and Parole, claiming $650.00 (Six Hundred Fifty Dollars) to replace his glasses plus
$100.00 (One Hundred Dollars) in gasoline expenses for medical visits in connection
with the incident of May 18,2006. Plaintiff can prove through court transcripts and
evidence that Defendant, Willard Lowe, admitted that Plaintiff had not caused him to
suffer a broken nose and the evidence proves that there was nothing wrong with his
hearing aid, but rather it was discovered that he could not hear well because his ear canal
was full of wax. It was also proved that there was nothing wrong with the lenses of
Defendant, Willard Lowe's eyeglasses and he really only required new frames. He
provided Judge Morris' court with a receipt for the replacement of his eyeglasses in the
amount of approximately $281.00 (Two Hundred Eighty One Dollars) in the summer of
2006 and/or February 15,2007, this receipt was apparently for eye exam, new lenses, and
new frames. Also, it is difficult to imagine that the Defendant traveled 500 miles for
Doctor visits.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Conspiracy to Commit Perjury and Obstruction of Justice)
1. Defendant has conspired with other persons to submit false information to
police and false testimony to the courts.
SIXTH CAUSE ADDENDUMS
1. Defendant, Willard Lowe conspired with Renee Hancock, to provide false
information and testimony to the authorities on May 18 and 19,2006 to Riverdale Police,
on or about June 21, 2006 to Judge Hadley's court, on or about October 4,2006 to Judge
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Dutson's court, and February 15,2007 to Judge Morris' court. This was the same false I
information described in the foregoing THIRD, FOURTH, and FIFTH CAUSES OF
ACTION in this complaint. Their goal was to lose Plaintiff as a neighbor by having him
evicted and to be jailed and made to pay money for being a bad neighbor.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress)
1. Through the afore mentioned actions of the Defendant, he has caused Plaintiff
to be evictedfromhis home of 34 years, and the dissolution of his marriage, ad the
subsequent loss of his home itself Also causing Plaintiffs health problems and
exacerbation of various diseases and disorders suffered by Plaintiff, thereby causing
Plaintiff to suffer extreme emotional distress.
SEVENTH CAUSE ADDENDUMS
1. Because of the false statements and false accusations of the Defendant, Willard
Lowe, regarding the Plaintiff he was a significant part of the reason MHP #9 filed two
unlawful detainer actions against the Plaintiff, the first of which was brought in August
2005, Civil Case No. 050904644, wherein the Plaintiff was accused of making threats
and which was defended Pro Se, with a favorable decision for Plaintiff in that case, Jason
Cody. The second of which was tried in Judge Dutson's court on or about October 4,
2006, and was initially defended, Pro Se, but ultimately by brand new attorneys and the
Plaintiff lost that case due to the conspiracy and perjury of Defendant and friend.
Plaintiff was the subject of a criminal case tried before Judge Morris on February 15,
2007, in which he was convicted of a felony and two Class A misdemeanors due mostly
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to the conspiracy and perjury of Defendant and friend. Plaintiff has also been the subject
of a civil stalking injunction hearing wherein the Plaintiff defended Pro Se in Judge
Hadley's court on or about June 21,2006, and a decision unfavorable to the Plaintiff,
Jason Cody, was rendered due to the conspiracy and perjury of the Defendant and friend.
One of the results of being repeatedly involved in litigation for two entire years because
of the false accusations of the Defendant andfriend,has been the unbelievable amount of
stress involved, which progressed into Ulcerative Colitis, Stress Induced Exacerbations of
Severe Asthma and episodes of Schizophrenia and the more ordinary, but still unpleasant
and unwelcome afflictions of G.E.R.D. and insomnia and the irritability that accompanies
them, not to mention the stress of worrying that my neighbor, Renee Hancock, and/or her
friend, Willard Lowe, may shoot me at anytime due to their irrational paranoid delusions
about me and the knowledge acquired in court, December 2,2005, that they have
concealed weapons permits that were acquired just because of me. These medical
conditions and their proximate cause can be coo berated by Stephen Bruce, M.D. Besides
the suffering involved there is also the expense of the medications and medical visits to
professionals. Unfortunately the Plaintiff was not the only one affected by this enormous
amount of unrelenting stress, as his wife, Ursula Cody, also suffered greatly and it all
became to much for her to bear in the summer of 2006 when shefiledfor divorce because
she couldn't stand the stress of these legal difficulties continually being brought against
me. It destroyed our marital relationship and she was granted her divorce in November of
2006, and then she lost her home valued at $34,000.00 (Thirty Four Thousand Dollars)
that same month of November 2006 when she was evictedfromthe trailer park and
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forced to move her trailer as well supposedly because I had been legally evicted. She sold
her home for $1,000.00 (One Thousand Dollars) to some vulture who was happy to take
advantage of her dire predicament, all caused by the Defendant andfriendwith their false
accusations and testimony. Plaintiff felt that he had a responsibility to her and obligated
himself to pay his ex-wife $20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) for her loss of home.
In addition to that obligation incurred by the Plaintiff, because of the improper and
wrongful actions and statements of the Defendant andfriend,Renee Hancock, the
Plaintiff is now obligated to pay the government additional income taxes of
approximately $1200.00 (One Thousand Two Hundred Dollars) per year and the value of
the loss of his spouse, due to the Defendant's wrongful acts, is incalculable but for
purposes of this lawsuit, the Plaintiff claims a minimum value of $100,000.00 (One
Hundred Thousand Dollars) for the loss of his spouse due to the continual legal problems
sproutingfromall the wrongful acts and statements of the Defendant and his friend,
Renee Hancock, which were and are outrageous, intolerable, immoral, indecent, illegal,
utterly revolting and indefensible.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Abusive and Malicious Prosecution of Plaintiff)
1. On May 18,2006, at about 5:00 PM, Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock made
serious criminal accusations and gave untruthful statements to the Riverdale City Police
alleging that the Plaintiff had assaulted them and also caused damage to their property
intentionally. This caused the Plaintiff to be arrested, jailed and prosecuted for serious
crimes for which the Plaintiff was convicted of by a Bench Trial in the court of Judge
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John Morris on February 15,2007 and then jailed again and ordered to pay restitution and
other costs totaling over $3000.00 (Three Thousand Dollars) all tolled. Additionally
Plaintiff has had to pay $7,000.00 (Seven Thousand Dollars) for attorney fees in his
defense which unfortunately for Plaintiff was not successful due to the Defendant and
friend committing perjury against the Plaintiff. The damages Plaintiff suffered due to the
false testimony of the Defendant andfriend,including his incarceration and restrictions
on his liberty due to probation terms will easily exceed $100,000.00 (One Hundred
Thousand Dollars), and were brought about by the malice of the Defendant and friend,
because if they had been truthful in their statements to Police and their testimony to the
courts it would have been them that was prosecuted rather than the Plaintiff. Defendant
andfriendtried very haixi to have Plaintiff sent to prison for crimes he is innocent of, due
to their hatred of the Plaintiff.
Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against the Defendant as follows:
1. An award of actual damages, (direct and consequential), in the amount of
$50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Dollars). Plus special damages for CAUSE OF ACTION
NO. 7 in an amount to be determined by the court.
2. An award of punitive damages four times the amount of actual damages
awarded.
3. For all costs incurred herein and for reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of
at least $250.00 (Two Hundred Fifty Dollars).
4. For interest on all judgment awards, at the highest legal rate in the state of
Utah.
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5. And for such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.

Dated this

Mr. Jason Cody
ProSe

Page 13

day of August 2007
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